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Abstract—Data attacks on meter measurements in the power
grid can lead to errors in state estimation. This paper presents a
new data attack model where an adversary produces changes
in state estimation despite failing bad-data detection checks.
The adversary achieves its objective by making the estimator
incorrectly identify correct measurements as bad data. The
proposed attack regime’s significance lies in reducing the min-
imum sizes of successful attacks to more than half of that of
undetectable data attacks. Additionally, the attack model is able
to construct attacks on systems that are resilient to undetectable
attacks. The conditions governing a successful data attack of
the proposed model are presented along with guarantees on its
performance. The complexity of constructing an optimal attack
is discussed and two polynomial time approximate algorithms for
attack vector construction are developed. The performance of the
proposed algorithms and efficacy of the hidden attack model are
demonstrated through simulations on IEEE test systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the basic facets of research and actual deployment
in smart grid has been increased data collection from differ-
ent meters for improved monitoring and control of dynamic
events. Accurate data collection also aids formation of optimal
prices and price-responsive demand. However, a data driven
approach makes the grid vulnerable to cyber-attacks on meter
measurements. A coordinated data attack on meter record-
ings in Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs) [1] and Remote
Terminal Units (RTUs) or on the communication channels in
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems
can in principle lead to incorrect electricity prices as well as
to large blackouts.
Data attacks on meter measurements in the power grid is
an active area of research. The authors of [2] first intro-
duced the problem of undetectable data attacks that bypass
bad-data tests at the state estimator. Simple linear algebraic
techniques show that if the malicious measurements lie in
the column space of the measurement matrix, the attack goes
undetected. In reference [2], an attack vector consisting of
the malicious measurements is constructed using projection
matrices based on the measurement matrix. This work has
been followed by several techniques to select locations for
introducing data attacks under different grid conditions and
adversarial objectives. Reference [3] discusses the construction
of an optimal hidden attack that requires manipulation of the
minimum number of measurements using l0 and l1 recovery
methods. Reference [4] studies the creation of the optimal
attack vector as a mixed integer linear program. The authors
of [5] discuss graph based design of optimal attack vectors for
systems observed by PMUs. Data attacks aimed at affecting
the estimation of a pre-specified set of state variables is
presented in [6]. A heuristic based detector for malicious data
is presented in [7].
A majority of the prior work in this area focus on con-
structing hidden data attacks that evade bad-data detection tests
at the state estimator. In this paper, we analyze a detectable
regime of data attacks. It is worth mentioning that at the state
estimator, bad data detection is followed by a scheme for
bad-data identification. Our proposed attack regime succeeds
despite detection by deceiving the bad-data identifier into
labeling uncorrupted measurements as bad data. While writing
this manuscript, we discovered a related work demonstration
detectable data attacks in [8]. The attack model in [8] searches
for an optimal hidden attack and then creates a detectable
attack by corrupting only half of the measurements necessary
for a hidden attack. In a sense, our model is a generalization
of the framework used in [8], with some key differences.
Our attack model considers power system cases where a
subset of the measurements are incorruptible by the adversary.
By overcoming the presence of incorruptible measurements,
the cardinality of our data attacks can be reduced by more
than 50% of the cardinality of the optimal hidden attack,
whereas in [8], the reduction in cardinality is exactly by half.
More importantly, unlike the framework in [8] our detectable
attack model is able to greatly expand the range of feasible
attacks to configurations where no hidden attacks are possible.
Further, we show that considering incorruptible measurements
in the system makes the problem of constructing an optimal
detectable attack NP-hard in general. In contrast, detectable
attacks that do not overcome incorruptible measurements can
be constructed in polynomial time in our measurement set-up.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next
section presents a description of the system model used in state
estimation and bad-data detection, and then introduces our data
attack model. We derive conditions necessary for a successful
attack of our regime and provide provable guarantees on their
cardinality in Section III. The two approximate algorithms to
design an optimal attack vector for our regime are presented
in Section IV. Both of them require information limited to
the structure of the measurement matrix and do not need
the numerical values of grid parameters. Simulations of the
proposed algorithms on test IEEE bus systems are shown in
Section V. Finally, concluding remarks and future directions
of work are presented in Section VI.
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Fig. 1. State Estimator for a power system [10], [11]
II. POWER GRID STATE ESTIMATION AND ATTACK
MODELS
We represent the power grid by an undirected graph (V,E),
where V denotes the set of buses and E represents the set of
transmission lines connecting those buses. In this paper, we
consider DC power flow model [11] for state estimation in
the grid that is given by:
z = Hx+ e (1)
Here z ∈ Rm is the m length vector of measurements. We
consider two kinds of measurements collected through con-
ventional meters and PMUs in the grid. These include: a) flow
measurements on lines and b) voltage phasor measurements on
buses. x ∈ Rn is the state vector of length n and consists of
the bus phase angles. H is the measurement matrix and e is a
zero mean Gaussian noise vector with covariance Σ. Let the
kth entry in z measure the power flow on the line between
nodes i and j. We have z(k) = Bijx(i) − Bijx(j), where
Bij is the magnitude of susceptance of the line (i, j). The
corresponding kth row in the measurement matrix H is given
by Hk = [0..0 Bij 0..0 −Bij 0..0]. Similarly, let the lth
entry in z measure the phase angle at bus i. The corresponding
row Hl in the measurement matrix is Hl = [0..0 1 0..0] with
one at the ith position. We assume m > n and full column
rank of matrix H , as necessary for unique state estimation.
State Estimator: The schematic diagram of the state es-
timator in the grid is shown in Figure 1 [10], [11]. For
the DC model in Equation (1), a Weighed Least Square
(WLS) Estimator gives the optimal state vector estimate x∗ by
minimizing the weighted measurement residual’s magnitude
J(x, z) = ‖Σ−.5(z − Hx)‖2. The estimator then uses the
following threshold (λ) based test to detect the presence of
bad-data.
‖Σ−.5(z −Hx∗)‖2 ≤ λ accept x∗
> λ detect bad-data (2)
Removal of Bad-data: Once bad-data is detected, the
estimator tries to remove the bad-data and then re-estimate the
state vector. The measurement residual vector r corresponding
to the estimated x∗ is given by r = z − Hx∗ = [I −
H(HTΣ−1H)−1HTΣ−1]z [10], [11]. Using this relation, we
can derive the variance Rr of residual r as well as the nor-
malized residual of the data. It is shown in [10], [11] that for
the general case of multiple bad data entries (as in our case),
a sequential bad-data remover described in previous literature,
is sub-optimal. The optimal strategy for the estimator is to
remove the minimum number of measurements such that the
residual produced by the remaining measurements passes the
bad-data detection test in (2). In addition, the estimator needs
to ensure that the removed measurements do not lead to a
loss of rank in the measurement matrix as that will make the
system unobservable. The optimal bad-data removal procedure
is formulated as the following non-convex problem [10]:
min
d∈{0,1}m
‖(1− d)‖0 (3)
s.t. rank(Hd) = n, J(x∗, zd) ≤ λd (4)
Here, Hd, zd, J(x∗, zd) and λd respectively denote the
updated measurement matrix, measurement vector, minimum
weighted residual magnitude and threshold obtained after the
measurements corresponding to 0 entries in d are removed.
A. Attack Models
Let the adversary introduce an attack vector a in the
measurements to generate the corrupted measurement vector
zˆ = z + a. We assume that the adversary is interested
in constructing a feasible attack using minimum number of
corrupted measurements (‖a‖0). In a realistic setting, an ad-
versary may be incapable of modifying certain measurements
due to geographical isolation or heightened encryption. We
call this set of incorruptible measurements as Sm and the
complimentary set of corruptible measurements as Scm. Note
that measurements in Sm suffer from noise and measurement
errors; they are just free of adversarial manipulation. Next,
we briefly describe hidden data attacks that bypass bad-data
detection checks.
Undetectable Data Attack: Observe that if a = Hc, the
measurement residual stays the same as ‖Σ−.5(z−Hx∗)‖2 =
‖Σ−.5(z+ a−H(x∗+ c))‖2. Thus, an erroneous state vector
x∗ + c is produced without raising any alarm at the bad-data
detector [2]. The solution to Problem P-1 below gives the
adversary’s optimal attack vector [3], [5].
min
c∈Rn−{0}
‖a‖0 (P-1)
s.t. a = Hc, a(i) = 0 ∀i ∈ Sm (Sm: incorruptible set)
Data Attack with Detection: We now discuss our proposed
detectable attack model. We assume that without any adversar-
ial manipulation, measurement z or any observability preserv-
ing subset of z is capable of producing a correct state estimate
x∗. Consider a data attack vector a that fails the bad-data
detection test. For the bad-data identification scheme given in
(3), this data attack can nonetheless change the state estimate
if removal of k < ‖a‖0 measurements is sufficient to satisfy the
bad-data detection test while maintaining system observability.
This provides the conditions needed by a feasible dat attack
of our proposed model. Construction of an attack vector for
this regime is given by the following optimization problem:
min
d∈{0,1}m
‖a‖0 (P-2)
s.t. a = d ∗ (Hc), c ∈ Rn − {0} (5)
a(i) = 0 ∀i ∈ Sm (Sm: incorruptible measurements)
‖a‖0 > ‖(1− d) ∗ (Hc)‖0 (6)
rank(DH) = n where diag(D) = d (7)
In Problem P-2, D is a diagonal matrix with diagonal given by
vector d. a∗ b represents element-wise multiplication between
two vectors a and b. Unlike Problem P-1, here a does not lie
in the column space of H as certain entries in the attack vector
are deleted by the binary vector d. Condition (6) ensures that
the estimator incorrectly identifies uncorrupted elements of z
as bad-data. Note that after removal of bad data, the attack
vector a = d ∗ (Hc) passes the bad-data detection test as it
lies in the column space of the updated measurement matrix
DH . In the next section, we discuss the design of an optimal
attack vector for Problem P-2.
III. OPTIMAL ATTACK VECTOR DESIGN
Consider the DC measurement model for a n bus system
given in Equation (1). We now introduce a (n+1)th reference
bus with phase angle 0 and augment c to form vector cˆ =
[
c
0
]
.
We also add one extra column hg after the rightmost column
in measurement matrix H to create a m times (n+1) modified
measurement matrix Hˆ . We put −1 in hg for every row in H
with a phase angle measurement and 0 otherwise. We now
have Hc = Hˆcˆ = [H | hg]
[
c
0
]
. Note that all rows in the
augmented measurement matrix Hˆ represent flows. We now
state the following theorem without proof from [5].
Theorem 1 ([5, Theorem 1]). There exists a non-zero binary
0−1 vector copt of size n times 1 for an optimal attack vector
a∗ for Problem P-1 such that ‖a∗‖0 = ‖Hcopt‖0.
In a similar way, it can be proven through contradiction
that the optimal attack vector a∗1 for Problem P-2 also
corresponds to a non-zero binary 0 − 1 vector copt1 with
‖a∗‖0 = ‖d ∗Hcopt1‖0.
Next we create a new matrix AH by replacing magnitudes
of all bus susceptance in Hˆ with unity.
AH(i, j) = 1(Hˆ(i, j) > 0)− 1(Hˆ(i, j) < 0) (8)
Observe that AH represents the incident matrix for a graph
with n+ 1 nodes, with edges corresponding to measurements
in Hˆ . We denote the graph represented by AH as GH . The
(n+ 1)th node in GH represents the reference bus with phase
angle 0. Notice that for any 0 − 1 vector cˆ =
[
c
0
]
, ‖Hˆcˆ‖0 =
‖AH cˆ‖0, where the non-zero values of AH cˆ represent a cut
in graph GH between the nodes with cˆ(i) = 0 and the nodes
with cˆ(i) = 1. We now write the attack vector design for our
proposed Problem P-2 in terms of AH as:
min
d∈{0,1}m
‖a‖0 (P-3)
s.t. a = d ∗ (AH cˆ), a(i) = 0 ∀i ∈ Sm
cˆ ∈ {0, 1}n+1 − {0}, cˆ(n+ 1) = 0
‖d ∗ (AH cˆ)‖0 > ‖(1− d) ∗ (AH cˆ)‖0 (9)
rank(DAH) = n where diag(D) = d (10)
Observe that non-zero values in AH cˆ define a graph-cut in
GH , out of which the edges with value 1 in d are included
in the attack vector a. a of course does not include any edge
in Sm. Further, condition (9) implies that an attack vector
is feasible if the number of cut-edges included in the attack
vector a is strictly greater than half of the cut-size. Our
principal result on constructing an optimal data attack of our
proposed regime is given in the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Let Ca∗ be a minimum cardinality cut in GH
such that the number of cut-edges in Ca∗ that belong to Sm
is strictly less than half of the cut-size |Ca∗ |. An optimal attack
vector for Problem P-3 is given by a sub-set of cut-edges in
Ca∗ ∩ Scm of cardinality b1 + |Ca∗ |/2c.
Proof: Let a∗ denote the attack vector with non-zero
entries corresponding to b1+|Ca∗ |/2c edges in Ca∗∩Scm. Thus
‖a∗‖0 is greater than |Ca∗ |/2 and condition (9) is satisfied.
The edges of Ca∗ excluded from a∗ are removed as bad-
data by the estimator. System observability is preserved if
graph GH stays connected after bad-data removal. If the graph
becomes disconnected after the bad-data removal, we can form
a smaller feasible graph-cut using a subset of the removed
edges and the ones with non-zero values in a∗. This contradicts
the definition of Ca∗ . Hence observability is maintained by
Ca∗ .
We now prove some important results on the adversarial
potential of data attacks of our regime as compared to unde-
tectable attacks.
Lemma 1. Let a∗u (undetectable attack) and a∗d (detectable
attack) respectively be the optimal attack vector designs for
Problem P-1 and Problem P-2, formulated for the same
system. Then the following holds: ‖a∗d‖0 ≤ b(1 + ‖a
∗
u‖0
2 )c
Proof: Note that if we fix d = 1 in Problems P-2
(≡ Problem P-3), it reduces to Problem P-1. The optimal
undetectable attack vector a∗u is given by Hcu ∃cu 6= 0. Let
‖a∗u‖0 = k with the non-zero entries in a∗u being located
at positions 1 to k. Consider ad such that ad(i) = a∗u(i)
for i ∈ {1, b(1 + k2 )c} and 0 elsewhere. It can be easily
verified that ad is a feasible detectable attack for Problem
P-3. As a∗d is the optimal attack for Problem P-3, we have
‖a∗d‖0 ≤ ‖ad‖0 = b(1 + ‖a
∗
u‖0
2 )c.
Note that this provides only an upper bound on the cardi-
nality of optimal attack vectors and in practice, the reduction
in cardinality can be much greater. Further the following is
true:
Lemma 2. The set of system conditions with feasible data
attacks for Problem P-3 is larger than that for Problem P-1.
Observe that every undetectable attack can give a corre-
sponding feasible detectable data attack with detection for our
proposed regime. However, data attacks with detection can
exist for cases where no undetectable attacks are possible. For
example, no undetectable attack exists if every cut in GH
includes at least one incorruptible measurement. An attack
with detection may exist if the number of edges of Sm in
a cut is less than the cut-size. The next result (proof omitted
for brevity) shows that for preventing detectable attacks, at
least 50% of the measurements need to be incorruptible.
Corollary 1. An attack vector for Problem P-3 always exists
if less than half of the measurements in the system are
incorruptible.
Thus, the number of incorruptible measurements needed to
prevent a detectable attack scales with the number of edges,
whereas that needed to prevent hidden attacks scales with
the number of nodes in GH . In the next section, we discuss
two approximate algorithms to generate attack vectors for this
regime.
IV. ALGORITHM FOR ATTACK VECTOR CONSTRUCTION
Theorem 3 gives the computational complexity of finding
the optimal attack vector in Problem P-3.
Theorem 3. Problem P-3 is NP-hard.
Proof steps: We prove this by showig the NP-hardness of
determining the existence of a feasible solution of Problem P-
3. Consider the case of GH being a complete graph with cut
C separating the nodes into sets A and Ac. Let the number of
edges of Sm in cut C be cutSm(A,A
c). For feasible attack,
cutSm(A,A
c) should be less than half of the cut-size |A||Ac|
(complete graph). Thus, we need cutSm (A,A
c)
|A||Ac| < .5. This
represents a ratio-cut of value less than .5. Thus our problem is
equivalent to establishing the existence of a ratio-cut of value
less than .5, a known NP-complete problem [12].
We now discuss two approximate schemes to find the
optimal solution for Problem P-3. The first scheme uses a
Semi-definite Programming based randomized approach [13].
(a) SDP approach: Our SDP based technique builds upon
the randomized solution for max-cut given by Goemans and
Williamson [13]. The following is a SDP relaxation to find
the optimal feasible cut in GH .
min
x∈{−1,1}n+1
〈L1H , xxT 〉
s.t.
〈L2H , xxT 〉
4
≤ −1
Relax−−−−−→
xxT toX
min
X∈Sn+1
〈L1H , X〉 (P-4)
s.t. diag(X) =1
〈L2H , X〉 ≤ −4
Here, Sn+1 is the space of positive semidefinite matrices of
size (n+1). L1H is the standard Laplacian matrix for graph GH
with edge-weights unity, while, L2H is a modified Laplacian
for GH where edges in Sm and Scm are given weights of 1 and
−1 respectively. The original problem tries to label nodes in
GH with values in {−1, 1} so that 〈L1H , xxT 〉/2 represents the
cut-size. 〈L
2
H ,xx
T 〉
4 ≤ −1 ensures that the cut contains greater
number of edges of Scm than of Sm. Following the work in
[13], we give randomized Algorithm 1 for Problem P-3.
Algorithm 1 SDP Relaxation for Problem P-3
1: Solve Problem P-4 to get X∗. Generate X∗ = BTB by
Cholesky decomposition.
2: Randomly pick a vector w ∈ Rn+1.
3: for i = 1ton+ 1 do
4: x(i) = 1(〈B(i, :), w〉 ≥ 0)− 1(〈B(i, :), w〉 < 0)
5: end for
6: if 〈L2H , xxT 〉 < 0 then
7: Output optimal attack as subset of 1 + b cut-size2 c edges
of Scm in cut defined by x.
8: end if
(b) Iterative Min-cut approach: The min-cut of GH
computed using unit-edge weights may contain more edges
of set Sm than of Scm and can be infeasible. Our approximate
Algorithm 2 tries to overcome this by iteratively computing the
min-cut with smaller edge-weights for set Scm. In particular,
steps 4 to 11 reduce the edge-weights for Scm to replace the
current infeasible min-cut (C) of cardinality c by a feasible cut
(if it exists) of cardinality c+b. If lowering edge weights alone
is not sufficient to achieve a feasible cut, step 13 chooses one
edge in C randomly that belongs to Sm and gives it infinite
weight. The algorithm iterates until a feasible solution is found
or all edges of Sm have been given infinite weights, which
indicates absence of any solution.
The theoretical analysis of the exact expressions for run-
time and performance guarantees of the proposed algorithms
will be covered in a future work. In the next section, we show
simulation results on the performance of the algorithms on
IEEE test systems.
V. RESULTS ON IEEE TEST SYSTEMS
We run simulations in Matlab Version 2009a and present
averaged results in this section. We consider the IEEE 14 bus
test system [9]. In this system, we put phasor measurements on
60% of the buses and flow measurements on all lines. Figure 2
shows the average sizes of the best attack vectors constructed
by our proposed solution schemes discussed in the previous
section. As expected, the size of the attack vector increases
with increase in the number of incorruptible measurements
(Sm) in the system. Moreover, we plot the average size of
undetectable attacks in the same figure to show the significant
improvement in cardinality offered by our attack regime; the
improvement being greater for Algorithm 2 than Algorithm
1. Next, Figure 3 plots the rise in the average fraction of
cases resilient to data attacks with number of incorruptible
measurements (set Sm). Observe that, unlike undetectable
attacks that increasingly become infeasible at higher levels of
secure measurements, feasible attacks of our proposed model
are still designed by Algorithm 1 and 2. Thus, total resilience
Algorithm 2 Iterative Min-cuts for Problem P-3
1: Give edge weight 1 −  in Scm. Compute min-cut C in
GH .
2: c← |C|, cm ←
∑
i∈C 1(i ∈ Sm), b← 1
3: while (c <∞, 2cm ≥ c) do
4: if 2cm ≥ b+ c then
5: β ← 1− − b(cm + b− b(c+ b− 1)/2c)−1
6: Give edge weight β in Scm, get min-cut C1 in GH .
7: if |C| = |C1| then
8: b← b+ 1
9: else
10: C ← C1, c← |C|, cm ←
∑
i∈C 1(i ∈ Sm), b← 1
11: end if
12: else
13: Randomly pick edge i ∈ C ∩ Sm, give ∞ weight.
14: β ← 1 − . Give weight of β to s Scm. Compute
min-cut C in GH .
15: c← |C|, cm ←
∑
i∈C 1(i ∈ Sm), b← 1.
16: end if
17: end while
18: if |C| 6=∞ then
19: Output optimal attack as 1 + b c2c edges of Scm in C.
20: end if
against attacks of our regime requires greater placement of
secure measurements than that needed for protection against
undetectable attacks. Both these figures validate our claim that
data attacks with detection are far more potent than previously
studied undetectable attacks.
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VI. CONCLUSION
We propose a new framework of detectable data attacks on
state estimation that operate by making the state estimator
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
fraction of incorruptible measurements (S
m
)
a
ve
ra
ge
 fr
ac
tio
n 
of
 c
as
es
 w
ith
 n
o 
fe
as
ib
le
 a
tta
ck
 
 
Undetectable attack
Detectable attack (Algorithm 1)
Detectable attack (Algorithm 2)
Fig. 3. Average fraction of simulated test cases with no feasible attacks given
by Algorithm 1 and 2 for IEEE 14 bus test system with flow measurements
on all lines, phasor measurements on 60% of the buses and protection on a
fraction of measurements selected randomly.
incorrectly label and remove good measurements as bad-
data. The minimum number of measurements that need to
be manipulated for a successful detectable data attack is
upper bounded by half of that needed for previously studied
undetectable data attacks. We show that the optimal attack
of our regime is given by the minimum cardinality graph cut
satisfying a feasibility constraint. We prove that the problem of
designing the optimal detectable attack is NP-hard and present
two approximate algorithms for it. Simulations of attack vector
construction on IEEE 14-bus system demonstrate that our
attack regime undermines the security of state estimation
further than current attack models. We are currently studying
guarantees on the performance of our algorithms and design
of protection schemes against our attack framework.
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